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THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND THE ATOMIC
ENERGY COMMISSION: THE NEED FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION
During the 196o's, the Atomic Energy Commission decided
that an abandoned salt mine near Lyons, Kansas, would be an
appropriate site for underground storage of radioactive wastes.
Largely through the efforts of geologist William Hambleton,
AEC studies of the site were shown to be deficient. Revelation
of the substantial dangers involved turned public support for the
project into opposition. Further resistance by the members of
Congress from Kansas resulted in legislation prohibiting im-
mediate purchase of the Lyons mine. Had Hambleton not
brought his independent research to public attention, the ill-
conceived project might have proceeded unhindered. The
evidence on which Hambleton based his findings should have
been discovered by AEC.'
Growing demands for power, coupled with depletion of traditional
sources of fuel, have resulted in increased utilization of nuclear generating
plants.' New uses of atomic energy for the production of power are cur-
rently under investigation.! Associated with this use of atomic energy,
1. For a full report on the Lyons project, see Lear, Radioactive Ashes in the Kan-
sas Salt Cellar, Saturday Review, Feb. 19, 1972, at 39. For example, Hambleton re-
vealed that:
[T]he AEC had based all its calculations on the supposition that there was a
single layer of pure shale underlain by a single layer of pure salt. . . . [C]ores
[drilled at Hambleton's suggestion] contained many alternating layers of salt
and shale. . . . [D]iscrepancies between the AEC's assumptions and the geo-
logical realities 'could be responsible for breaking the seal' of rocks overlying
the salt and for pernitting entry of surface or subsurface waters into the salt
bed to create erosional problems and to invite dangerous convection effects.
Id. at 41.
2. In 1969, the total U.S. power requirement was 65,645 trillion B.t.u.'s. The fore-
cast from the Office of Science & Technology estimates a requirement of 170,000 trillion
B.t.u.'s by the year 2000 if real gross national product increases at four per cent per
year. Such a forecast may not, however, reflect the growing concern for the environ-
ment, changes in efficiency of energy conversion and changes in patterns of use. Esti-
mates vary as to the future extent of use of nuclear fuel. It has been suggested that by
2000, oil will be the most important fuel and natural gas the next, and either coal will
be slightly ahead of nuclear, or, as the FPC and AEC predict, nuclear slightly ahead of
coal, or nuclear sources much greater than coal. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Div., LEGISLA-
TIVE REFERENCE SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE ECONOMY, ENERGY AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT 4-5 (1970) [hereinafter cited as THE ECONOMY].
3. The AEC participates in the Plowshare Program, which is designed to develop
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
however, are potentially significant effects on the environment, the full
extent of which is not yet known.: Since protection of the environ-
ment has become a national goal,5 environmental impact is a discrete
factor in governmental decision-making concerning power production and
its regulation.
'Meaningful administrative consideration of envilronmental con-
sequences, however, requires a complete record. The presence of a com-
prehensive environmental analysis in the record makes visible to the public
and the legislature the relative weight given environmental problems by
the agency. The contention of this note is that litigation under the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969' (NEPA) and the Freedom of
Information Act7 (FIA) is particularly suited for insuring that relevant
environmental information is presented to both the agencies and the
public.' This discussion will focus on the AEC because of the growing
peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. Plowshare studies related to power production have
included the use of explosions to heat rock, which would in turn heat water, creating
steam to run generators. Explosions are also used to stimulate natural gas formation.
AEC, MAJOR ACTIVITIES IN THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAMS 195-201 (1971) ; Crowther
v. Seaborg, 415 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1969) ; Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D.
Colo. 1970). See also N. LANDAU & P. RHEINGOLD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HAND-
BOOK 318-28 (1971) [hereinafter cited as LANDAU].
4. For description of the environmental problems associated with power plants, see
THE ECONOMY, supra note 2, at 92-114. Nuclear generating plants emit radioactive par-
ticles into the atmosphere and into the cooling water. These emissions are probably
within radiation standards, but the standards themselves have become controversial.
See note 19 infra. There is also danger of an accident which could release high level
radiation from the nuclear fuel cells. (The emergency systems have never been tested.
Louisville Courier-Journal & Times, Feb. 13, 1972, § H, at 3, col. 4.) Another major
effect of power plant operation is thermal pollution. In general, water is used to absorb
heat produced in the generating process. If the heated water is discharged into natural
bodies of water, the resulting temperature change effects the conditions of aquatic life,
the evaporation rate and the concentrations of minerals. When direct discharge is
avoided through the use of cooling towers, there are additional problems of noise and
local fog or icing. Additional problems include interference with other land uses and
aesthetic values. These problems occur with any large facility, but may be aggravated
by such measures as the cooling towers used to reduce other pollution factors. For
analysis of radiation and thermal effects connected with a particular plant, see two pa-
pers prepared primarily by members of the Cornell University staff. CITIZENS COMM. ro
SAVE CAYUGA LAKE, RADIOACTIVITY AND A PROPOSED POWER PLANT ON CAYUGA LAKE
(1968); CITIZEN'S COMM. TO SAVE CAYUGA LAKE, THERMAL POLLUTION OF CAYUGA
LAKE BY A PROPOSED POWER PLANT (1968). Waste storage presents dangers of leakage
of radioactivity, whether in liquid or solid form and whether in transit or permanently
situated.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970).
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
8. For extensive discussion of the tactic of resorting to the courts for environmen-
tal protection, see J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1970) [hereinafter cited as
SAX].
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use of atomic energy and the special technical and legal problems involved
in the development of nuclear power sources.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954' delegated control of the develop-
ment and use of atomic energy to the AEC."° Yet, various factors indicate
that the AEC, in its exercise of control, may be underestimating the im-
portance of environmental considerations. Although the Act envisions
both regulatory and promotional functions," this combination of duties
creates a potential conflict of interest.' Perhaps because it was organized
long before widespread environmental concern, the AEC appears to give
greater priority to alleviating the power crisis than to environmental
problems." Since the AEC has had a long and close working relation-
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1970).
10. One former responsibility of the AEC, the development of general environ-
mental radiation standards, has been transferred to the Environmental Protection Agency.
Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, § 2(a) (5), 84 Stat. -, 5 U.S.C. App. (1970). AEC,
however, will continue to set and enforce guidelines and regulations which are in com-
pliance with standards set by the EPA.
11. For example, § 2(g) of the Act authorizes use of federal funds for "the de-
velopment and use of atomic energy." 42 U.S.C. § 2 012(g) (1970). Section 3 pro-
vides for:
(a) a program of conducting, assisting, and fostering research and de-
velopment in order to encourage maximum scientific and industrial progress;
(b) a program for the dissemination of unclassified scientific and technical
information ... so as to encourage scientific and industrial progress;
(c) a program for Government control of the possession, use, and pro-
duction of atomic energy and special nuclear material.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2013(a)-(c) (1970).
12. Former Chairman Glenn T. Seaborg, responding to a question in an interview,
stated: "I think our regulatory functions as a whole, including the licensing and com-
pliance part of it, will be and should be set up in a separate agency at some time in the
future.... ." Trippe, Legal Problems in the Use of Nuclear Explosives for Civil Pur-
poses, 12 AToMIc ENERGY L.J. 377, 392 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Trippe]. See also
Tarlock, Tippy & Francis, Environmental Regulation of Power Plant Siting: Existing
and Proposed Institutions, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 502, 523 n.91 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Tarlock].
13. This attitude is reflected in another quotation from former Chairman Seaborg:
[T]oday's outcries about the environment will be nothing compared to the cries
of angry citizens who find that power failures due to a lack of sufficient generat-
ing capacity to meet peak loads have plunged them into prolonged blackouts....
THE ECONOMY, supra note 2, at 19. In Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC,
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court commented: "In the end, the Commission's
long delay seems based upon what it believes to be a pressing national power crisis."
449 F.2d at 1122. In fact, the AEC seems to have been subject to criticism on the same
kinds of issues as are involved in application of NEPA and FIA since very early in the
Commission's history. In 1956, the AEC Reactor Safeguards Committee raised serious
technical questions about the safety of a midwestern reactor. The AEC refused to make
the report public until it received pressure from Congress and several labor unions. As
a result, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards was established as a statutory
body with the duty of reviewing safety studies and license applications. 42 U.S.C. § 2039
(1970). See Ramey, The Role of the Public in the Development and Regulation of Nu-
clear Power, 12 AToMIc ENERGY L.J. 3, 11 (1970) (article by a. Commissioner of the
AEC) [hereinafter cited as Ramey].
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ship with the power industry it regulates,' 4 industrial influence is signi-
ficant in its decisions. All these elements contribute to an attitude on the
part of the AEC likely to result in placing development and application of
atomic energy before other goals.
The AEC has recently established an Office of Environmental Af-
fairs to serve "as a focal point for contacts with outside organizations on
environmental matters."' 5 The AEC also acknowledges as necessary"
and provides for public participation in its decision-making process."7
Intervention in administrative proceedings, however, does not guarantee
that agencies will give environmental considerations, adequate attention. 8
One reason may be that the power of the AEC over employment, research
grants and consultant contracts could prevent experts from contradicting
the Commission's official stance.' However, an intervenor employing
NEPA and FIA may effectively use the courts to insure that relevant
environmental information is considered by agencies before they act.
THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969
NEPA constitutes the first comprehensive national legislation ex-
pressing environmental protection as its goal. The stated purposes of
NEPA are:
To declare a national policy which will encourage produc-
tive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment;
14. As Prof. Sax describes the process, "[rdegulation in the name of the public in-
terest" has been "a two-party enterprise carried on between the regulated and the pro-
fessional regulator." SAX, supra note 8, at xix.
15. 10 C.F.R. § 1.29 (1972).
16. The prevailing attitude in the industry, as expressed publicly, appears to be
that some public participation is welcomed. See Ramey, supra note 13, at 20.
17. Commissioner Ramey has identified as points of public participation congres-
sional hearings, public meetings and mandatory public hearings in licensing proceedings
(which allow intervention and limited appearances) and publication of rule-making and
licensing information for comments. Id. at 3.
18. "So far the agency system has done a poor job of protecting the environment."
Handzel, Preservation of the Environment through the Doctrines Covering Judicial Re-
view of Administrative Agencies, 15 ST. Louis UNIV. L.J. 429 (1971). But see Jaffe,
The Administrative Agency and Environmental Control, 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 231 (1970) :
"The so-called failure of the agencies is only incidentally their failure. It is the failure
of the society itself and more particularly the dominant centers of the government."
19. Like, Multi-Media Confrontations-The Environmentalists' Strategy for a 'No
Win' Agency Proceeding, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495, 502-03 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Like].
That experts' apprehensions may be justified is suggested by the disagreement over radia-
tion standards. Two AEC scientists, Gofman and Tamplin, have challenged radiation
levels set as safe by the AEC on the grounds that they take insufficient account of long
term low level exposure. A serious charge in such a controversy, it has been alleged
that they have been harassed by the AEC, including tactics such as reductions in staff
and funding. See SCIENCE, Aug. 28, 1970, at 838.
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to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare
of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems
and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish
a Council on Environmental Quality.2"
The Act further elaborates on environmental goals and requires the
Government to perform consistently with them. In developing appropriate
procedures, agencies are to: "utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary ap-
proach" ;21 "include . . . a detailed statement" covering "environmental
impact," unavoidable "adverse . . . effects," "alternatives," "the rela-
tionship between . . . short- . . . and . . . long-term" effect and "ir-
reversible and irretrievable commitments of resources"22 and "initiate
and utilize ecological information in the planning and development of
resource-oriented projects."2 Before discussing court enforcement of
these procedures, a private party's right under NEPA to challenge an
agency's final order must be considered.
Standing has traditionally proved to be an obstacle to private suits
against agencies.2  Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, suggest
that suits to enforce NEPA should not encounter standing problems. In
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,25
the Court noted that "where statutes are concerned, the trend is toward
enlargement of the class of people who may protest administrative
action."28 The Court formulated two questions as being determinative of
standing, "whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has
caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise,"27 and "whether the
interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the
20. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (1970).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970). Note that NEPA shifts the burden to the
Government to study alternatives. Cf. Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D.
Colo. 1970).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(G) (1970).
24. LANDAU, supra note 3 at 63-64. For more complete discussions of standing and
the relevant cases, see Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen
Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 230 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Hanks] ; Comment, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doc-
trines and Evolving Theories to Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1085 (1970).
25. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). This was a suit challenging a ruling by the Comptroller
of the Currency that national banks could make data processing services available to
bank customers and to others. The action had been dismissed for lack of standing.
Standing was granted under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act [5 U.S.C. §§ 701-
06 (1970)], making the decision applicable to all agencies.
26. 397 U.S. at 156.
27. Id. at 152.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitu-
tional guarantee in question." 8
Under the Data Processing test, NEPA would appear to dictate
that conservation groups, as well as individuals, be granted standing. A
requisite "injury in fact" would arise from an agency decision detri-
mentally affecting the environment which was reached without consider-
ing all relevant environmental information. When NEPA § 101(c),
which states that "Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a
healthful environment,"29 is read with the general purposes and duties
imposed upon the Government elsewhere in the Act, a "federally
recognized interest in the promotion of a healthy environment"" ° is
created. Thus, when an agency fails to carry out the mandate of NEPA,
an environmental "interest" within the "zone of interests to be protected"
has been violated.
The question of whether NEPA can be enforced by groups with a
national, rather than a local, membership, has not been decided by the
Supreme Court.8 Given the mobility of U.S. society, no action by the
federal government of sufficient environmental impact to fall under
NEPA should be considered to be of local interest only. If a major reason
for limiting standing is to insure that the litigated interest is properly
represented, a national organization may be the only body possessing the
financial support and organization necessary to pursue the appeal ade-
quately. This is especially true when the agency involved, like the AEC,
has a virtual monopoly on the necessary information. Also, a national
organization's interest in the precedential value of each case, in addition
28. Id. at 153.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1970).
30. This phrase was used in Delaware v. Pennsylvania N.Y. Cent. Transportation
Co., 323 F. Supp. 487 (D. Del. 1971), in which a challenge to a dike and fill project was
found to be within the jurisdiction of the court because of NEPA, among other grounds.
The case was stayed for action by the court in bankruptcy.
31. Sierra Club v. Morton, 40 U.S.L.W. 4397 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1972), denied the
Sierra Club standing to challenge permits granted by the Secretary of the Interior and
the Secretary of Agriculture to develop a ski resort, but the suit was not based on NEPA.
The decision affirmed the determination of the Ninth Circuit [433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir.
1970)] as to the standing of the Sierra Club; the case now returns to the district court.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion, despite the fact that it denied standing, went on to discuss
the merits of the case, a matter that the Supreme Court did not reach.
The court of appeals' view of the standing issue appears to have been influenced by
its belief that the administrative agencies had adequately determined the use of the land
in terms of the public interest. The court distinguished Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1965), on the
basis that there was a statute specifically granting standing in that controversy; how-
ever, the analysis in Data Processing suggests that this point should not be determinative.
See also Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. California, 437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 908 (1971).
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to the particular outcome, means that its best advantage lies in developing
every case to the fullest extent possible.
Once the standing problem is resolved, NEPA embodies new proce-
dural requirements upon which judicial review can be based. As noted
in Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin :2
[T]he Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
Secretary on the merits of the proposed program but will require
that the Secretary comply with the procedural requirements of
the National Environmental Policy 'Act. ... 3
Thus, for purposes of judicial review, courts appear to be adopting the
"without observance of procedures required by law""4 standard of the
Administrative Procedure Act instead of the "arbitrary or capricious, an
abuse of discretion""s or "unsupported by substantial evidence" stan-
dards of that Act, which are more difficult for environmentalists to
meet." This represents a shift in focus from the outcome of the decision
to the specific methods utilized in reaching that outcome. In limiting
review of NEPA cases to procedural questions, therefore, courts have
avoided problems previously associated with judicial review of admin-
istrative decisions.
Since NEPA primarily imposes procedural duties, agency regula-
tions concerning the compilation and consideration of environmental
impact statements take on major significance. In Calvert Cliffs' Coord-
inating Committee, Inc. v. AEC,"5 the court considered a challenge to
AEC regulations purporting to implement NEPA" Examining NEPA
32. 325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971).
33. Id. at 1404. This suit sought an injunction against the Secretary of Agricul-
ture's program to control fire ants with spray. The injunction was denied because plain-
tiffs failed to show irreparable damage. The court gained jurisdiction through NEPA.
But see Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1971), which suggests that NEPA might be the basis for reversal of a substantive de-
cision if "it be shown that the actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck was
arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values." Id. at 1115. No
reported case has followed the D.C. Circuit's suggestion.
34. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (D) (1970).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1970).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970).
37. Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Ad-
ministrative Law, 70 COLum. L. REv. 612, 619 (1970) ; see Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F.
Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970) (agency action did not constitute abuse of discretion). State
courts tend to apply similar standards. See, e.g., UMW v. Colorado Pub. Util. Comm'n,
170 Colo. 556, 463 P.2d 465 (1970) (sufficient competent evidence in record to support
agency action).
38. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Plaintiff was an organization concerned about
the environmental hazards of locating a nuclear generating plant on Chesapeake Bay.
39. 10 C.F.R. § 50 App. D (1971). Plaintiff raised four specific objections. First,
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and its applicability to the AEC, the court stated that "[p]erhaps the
greatest importance of NEPA is to require the . . . agencies to consider
environmental issues just as they consider other matters within their
mandates."4 The court held that the AEC, in addition to fulfilling its
traditional duty of evaluating radiological effects, was "compelled" to
consider all adverse environmental effects. This represents a significant
expansion of that agency's former responsibilites.4 The Commission did
did not appeal the court's ultimate holding that the regulations had to be
revised.42
The subsequently revised regulations 3 appear to represent an attempt
the regulations did not require independent evaluation of staff recommendations by the
hearing board. The court's reaction was "that the Commission's crabbed interpretation
of NEPA makes a mockery of the Act." 449 F.2d at 116-17. Second, the delay in al-
lowing consideration of environmental issues was said to reveal "a rather thoroughgoing
reluctance to meet the NEPA procedural obligations in the agency review process."
Id. at 1119. Third, the court said that the AEC's acceptance of another agency's evalua-
tion of environmental effects without independent analysis was
in fundamental conflict with the basic purpose of the Act. NEPA mandates a
case-by-case balancing judgment on the part of federal agencies. . . . Certifi-
cation by another agency that its own environmental standards are satisfied in-
volves an entirely different kind of judgment.
Id. at 1123. But see Tarlock, supra note 12, at 536. Fourth, with respect to allowing
construction begun previously to proceed on the original plans regardless of what en-
vironmental damage the reports revealed, the court observed that "the Commission seems
to believe that the mere drafting and filing of papers is enough to satisfy NEPA." 449
F.2d at 1127.
40. Id. at 1112 (emphasis in original).
41. Calvert Cliffs' is the first major judicial acceptance of the argument that
NEPA expands the jurisdiction of federal licensing agencies. . . . A strict
reading of these sections in light of their legislative history suggests that the
NEPA is not jurisdictional, but that it expresses a policy of statutory con-
struction for agencies and courts to follow in resolving cases of doubtful statu-
tory authority.
Tarlock, supra note 12, at 538. Contra, Hanks, supra note 24, at 251-58. See also Brooks,
Millstone Two and the Rainbow: Planning Law and Environmental Protection, 4 CONN.
L. REV. 54 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brooks].
42. AEC has since asked Congress to modify the nation's environmental protection
law temporarily and permit what it called "emergency" operation of nuclear power
plants now idled by environmental disputes. Washington Post, Mar. 17, 1972, § A, at 1,
col. 8.
43. 10 C.F.R. § 50 App. D (1972). For a discussion of possible effects of the re-
vision, see Gillette, AEC's New En'vironmental Rules for Nuclear Plants May Open New
Debate, Extend Delays, Raise Plant Costs, SCIENCE, Sept. 17, 1971, at 1112. The regula-
tions largely reflect the guidelines promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality.
Statement on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting the Environment: Guidelines 36 Fed.
Reg. 7724 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Guidelines]. Under the new rules, the applicant
submits an environmental report at the construction and operation license stages, in-
cluding the elements required by NEPA. The Director of Regulation is in charge of
analyzing the report and preparing a draft statement. The report and draft statements
are made available to the public, with time limits for comments from outside sources.
After receiving the comments, the Director prepares the final statement. The statement
at the operational stage is to cover only those aspects which are different from those at
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to comply with the Calvert Cliffs' decision. Given the AEC's traditional
assignment of high priority to the development of atomic energy, how-
ever, no one case can be expected to guarantee that NEPA procedures
will be fully implemented. This can be seen in a recently filed suit which
challenged an AEC license grant under a regulation allowing temporary
licenses without an environmental impact statement. 4
The courts' interpretations of NEPA suggest that the role of the
Act lies between the extremes predicted by the commentators. Some en-
vironmentalists feared that the Act would remain a policy statement only,
with little possibility of enforcement. Thus it has been suggested that
nominal agency compliance would be found sufficient, thus resulting in
evasion of the statute.4 ' This latter danger seems to have been foreclosed
by the position taken by the court in Calvert Cliffs' and by the Council on
Environmental Quality that the "fullest extent possible" language of
NEPA § 10248 sets a high standard of performance.' However, hopeful
predictions by commentators that NEPA can be "an environmental bill
of rights" 48 do not appear to be justified. The interest created by NEPA
§ 101 (c), upon which this optimistic view is based, appears to be con-
fined to insuring that proper procedures are followed. The view that
seems to be gaining acceptance in judicial interpretation is that the Act
requires the Government "to improve and coordinate the Federal plans,
functions, programs and resources; but it does not purport to vest .
a 'right' to the type of environment envisioned therein. ' 49 This interpreta-
tion appears to be the soundest because Congress has not made the re-
quisite social decisions defining "the type of environment envisioned
therein" or how it is to be achieved. Thus, by assuring that environmental
considerations assume a role in the decision-making process, NEPA
the construction stage. Draft statements are to be available ninety days, and final state-
ments thirty days, before hearings.
44. The suit is described in Outdoor America (a newspaper published by the Izaak
Walton League), Dec., 1971, at 1, col. 2. The Izaak Walton League and the Illinois
State Community Action Program of the United Auto Workers combined to prevent
the issuance of an operating license for the Cordova, Ill., nuclear generating plant. The
suit was settled when the AEC agreed to certain controls. Louisville Courier-Journal,
Apr. 3, 1972, § B, at 3, col. 4.
45. Note, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing7,
37 BROOKLYN L. REv. 139, 145-46 (1970).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
47. "[It] does not provide an escape hatch for foot dragging agencies . . . [Rather
it] sets a high standard which must be vigorously enforced by the reviewing courts."
449 F.2d at 1114. See also CEQ Guidelines, supra note 43, at 7724.
48. See Hanks, supra note 24; LANDAU, supra note 3, at 137-38.
49. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, 755 (E.D.
Ark. 1971). The court granted an injunction against construction of a dam until NEPA
was complied with.
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represents the first step, rather than the last, in the development of com-
prehensive environmental policy, theory and practice.5"
THE INFORMATION PROBLEM AND THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
The value of the procedures required by NEPA depends significantly
on whether the information the agency takes into consideration is as com-
plete as possible. Scientists do not always agree on theory or findings,
even when based on the same data." NEPA can be satisfied, however,
by including opposing views in an impact statement.3 2
The more important informational problem is the availability of all
information possessed by an agency relevant to the environment, whether
or not the data are included in the impact statement or in other parts of
the agency's record. NEPA requires agencies to provide copies of en-
vironmental statements and comments solicited from other bodies to the
President, the CEQ and the public in accordance with the Freedom of
Information Act." One court has gone so. far as to call NEPA "an en-
vironmental full disclosure law . . . intended to make [agency] deci-
sion-making more responsive and more responsible."5 But the impact
50. To the extent that NEPA requires development of a full record in agency
proceedings and grants standing to conservation groups, it can be seen as writing an
earlier case, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1965), into law. See Atkeson, New Institutional Arrange-
ments to Balance Energy and Environmental Needs, 4 NATURAL RESOURCES LAw 774, 776
(1971).
51. Referring to the controversy over radiation standards, the District Court for
the District of Colorado said:
[T]he "scientific" disagreement in such cases . . .may in reality be a disagree-
ment with the value judgment that utilization of materials and processes which
produce radiation should proceed even though all risks may not be known.
Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205, 1232 (D. Col. 1970).
52. See Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 3 BNA ENVIRONMENT
REP., CASES 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1971) :
When, as here, the issue of procedure relates to the sufficiency of the presenta-
tion in the statement, the court is not to rule on the relative merits of competing
scientific opinion. Its function is only to assure that the statement sets forth
the opposing scientific views.
Id. at 1128.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
54. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, 759
(E.D. Ark. 1971). See also Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. §§ 531, 532 (1971), 42
U.S.C. § 4321, note (1970), ordering agencies to:
(b) Develop procedures to ensure the fullest practicable provision of
timely public information and understanding of Federal plans and programs
with environmental impact in order to obtain the views of interested parties. ...
(c) Insure that information regarding existing or potential environmental
problems and control methods developed as part of research, development, dem-
onstration, test, or evaluation activities is made available to Federal agencies
• . . and other entities, as appropriate.
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statement and comments by themselves may not be sufficient guides 'by
which to measure compliance with NEPA. The AEC's impact statements
for plant licensing proceedings are prepared on the basis of the license
applicant's report. Since cost minimization is to the applicant's advantage,
its report will probably underemphasize environmental concerns likely to
result in increased expenditures. An intervenor must be able to make an
independent assessment of a project's impact, as well as to subject the
Commission's statement to intensive scrutiny.55 Necessary information
and aids for its analysis are most likely to be found in the hands of the
AEC because of its pre-eminence in the atomic energy field. The avail-
ability of any information from the Commission is determined by FIA.
The Freedom of Information Act, an amendment to the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act," is designed to insure that information concern-
ing the organization, procedures, regulations, activities and other "identi-
fiable records" of administrative agencies are available to "any person.""
Subject to nine exemptions,58 the Act makes disclosure the general rule.
An action may be brought in a federal district court to "enjoin the agency
from withholding agency records and . . . order the production of any
agency records improperly withheld."59 The burden of proof in such an
action is placed on the agency.
A review of judicial interpretation of FIA reveals a trend toward
expanding disclosure. Interpretation of its legislative history has been a
major factor in this trend. The bill was first passed in the Senate, and
that body's committee report "° expressed a liberal disclosure policy. The
bill was then adopted by the House without change, but its committee
report61 indicated a much more restrictive attitude.8 2 Relying heavily on
55. . . . Too often the environmentalist takes for granted the efficiency of
the technology which is incorporated in the questioned project and accepts un-
critically the project's numerical or quantitative values as represented by the
project's sponsors.
... . [T]he computation of radiation dosage involves many unverifiable
assumptions and meteorological variables . . . [and] a process of negotiation
between the AEC technical staff and the utility. . . . Unfortunately the calcu-
lation of offsite doses takes place behind closed doors and sometimes involves
what have been called 'knock-down, drag-out battles.'
Like, supra note 19, at 508-10.
56. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1970).
57. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970).
58. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970).
59. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1970).
60. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
61. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
62. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, SUPPLEMENT § 3A.2 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as DAVIS] :
In general, the Senate committee is relatively faithful to the words of the act,
and the House committee ambitiously undertakes to change the meaning that
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the House view, the Attorney General wrote a memorandum explicating
the Act for the agencies."3 However, courts have adopted the Senate
report as the basis for interpreting the Act."' Denial of trial court dis-
cretion to allow an agency to withhold information which does not fall
within one of the exemptions has further contributed to expanded dis-
closure. Thus, in Getman v. NLRB,"5 the court stated that "[t]he
legislative plan creates a liberal disclosure requirement, limited only by
specific exemptions which are to be narrowly construed."6 Certain of
those exemptions, however, are likely to create difficulty when the rele-
vant information concerns atomic power production projects. These
exemptions are for national defense, trade secrets and inter-, intra-agency
memoranda.
The national defense exemption 7 raises a problem, peculiar to the
appears in the Act's words. The main thrust of the House committee remarks
• . . is almost always in the direction of nondisclosure.
63. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFOR-
MATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1967). The memorandum
"consistently relies on . . . remarks by the House Committee." DAVIS, supra note 62,
§ 3A.2. It "reflects the point of view of the agencies, all of whom opposed the enact-
ment." Id., § 3A.1. This opposition, according to some commentators, has been con-
tinued in a policy of ignoring or attempting to circumvent the Act. Fellmeth, The Free-
dom of Information Act and the Federal Trade Commission: A Study in Malfeasance, 4
HARV. CiV. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 345 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Fellmeth] ; Nader,
Freedom from Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. CIV. RIGHTs-CIr. LIB.
L. REV. 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Nader]. The agencies' continuing reluctance is
suggested by the statement of a congressional aide: "If an applicant appeals to the direc-
tor of an agency and shows willingness to go to court, he will generally get his informa-
tion." Wade, Freedom of Information: Officials Thwart Public Right to Know, Scx-
ENcE, Feb. 4, 1972, at 498 [hereinafter cited as Wade].
64. See Benson v. General Serv. Administration, 289 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Wash.,
1968) :
The House Report accompanied the bill on its passage through the House of Rep-
resentatives, after the bill had already passed the Senate. It therefore seems to
me that it represents the thinking of only one house, and to the extent that the
two reports disagree, the surer indication of Congressional intent is to be found in
the Senate Report, which was available for consideration.
Id. at 595. See also Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administra-
tion, 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The Attorney General's memorandum, there
fore, is given little weight. As Prof. Davis comments, "The Memorandum is the law
in the sense that it guides the government's practices under the Act, but it is not the
law in the sense of binding the courts." DAVIS, supra note 62, § 3A.1.
65. 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
66. Id. at 672, quoting Bristol Myers v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Getman's narrow construction of the exemptions suggests that the agencies may no
longer create loopholes by interpreting the language of the exemptions loosely. See Katz,
The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek under the FOIA, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 1261
(1970) ; Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute and the Regulations, 56 GEo. L.J.
18 (1967).
67. This section does not apply to matters that are-(l) specifically required
by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or
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AEC Plowshare Program, involving experiments with atomic explosions
for power production. These experiments employ technology identical to
that used in building nuclear weapons." Therefore, environmental in-
formation about such a blast could be withheld because of its military
significance. This problem, however, appears to have been attenuated
by the decision in Mink v. EPA." Mink concerned an effort to obtain
documents reviewing the underground nuclear test at Amchitka, Alaska.
The trial court refused disclosure upon a finding that the documents fell
within the national defense and inter-, intra-agency memorandum exemp-
tions. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed
and remanded, ordering in camera inspection by the district court to
determine:
. . . whether, and to what extent, the file contains documents
that are now within the umbrella of a secret file but which would
not have been independently classified as secret. Such documents
are not entitled to the secrecy exemption [for national defense
data] solely by virtue of their association with separately clas-
sified documents. .... 71
Under such a rule of separability, much information on the Plowshare
Program should be made available.
The AEC's interpretation"' of the trade secrets exemption7 1 is re-
flective of its general adherence to the interpretation of FIA's disclosure
foreign policy.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (1970).
68. Trippe, supra note 12, at 382.
69. 40 U.S.L.W. 2233 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 15, 1971), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3428
(U.S. Mar. 6, 1972). The suit was brought by 33 congressmen; the trial had dismissed
the suit insofar as plaintiffs were acting in their official capacity because of separation
of powers, and insofar as they were acting as private citizens because of the application
of the exemptions.
70. Id. The court applied the same reasoning to the intra-, inter-agency memoran-
dum exemption. Decisions such as this suggest that courts will not allow agencies to
evade the Act, whether by the sort of "commingling" (a term coined in Nader, supra note
63) which was specifically dealt with here and in Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp.
v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970), and Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067
(D.C. Cir 1971), or by unfounded agency replies that there was insufficient identifica-
tion of the documents requested. See Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
See also Fellmeth, supra note 63; Gianella, Agency Procedures Implementing the Free-
dom of Information Act: A Proposal for Uniform Regulations, 23 AD. L. REV. 217
(1971); Nader, supra note 63; Wade, supra note 63.
71. 10 C.F.R. § 9.5(a) (4) (1972).
72. This section does not apply to matters that are-
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4) (1970).
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requirements adopted by the House report and the Attorney General's
memorandum. The AEC regulation begins by duplicating the language
of the Act but adds the following qualifications:
Matter subject to this exemption is that which is cus-
tomarily held in confidence by the originator. It includes, but is
not limited to:
(i) Information received in confidence, such as trade
secrets, inventions and discoveries, and proprietary data;
(ii) Technical reports and data, designs, drawings, speci-
fications, formulae, or other types of proprietary information
which are generated or developed by the AEC or for the AEC
under contract."8
The language of the introductory sentence and subsection (i) is an
attempt to apply the exemption to any information given the Government
in confidence. Because the AEC dominates the atomic energy field, the
expansive interpretation in (ii) could be used to prevent disclosure of
environmentally relevant information. It appears doubtful, however, that
these attempts to limit disclosure can stand. The Commission's interpre-
tation reflected in (i) has been specifically rejected in at least two cases.74
With regard to subsection (ii), courts have said that the trade secrets
exemption "condones withholding information only when it is obtained
from a person outside the agency."7 The judicial interpretation seems
more justifiable than that of the Commission since, absent considerations
of national defense, a governmental body should hardly be considered to
have a proprietary interest in information generated from the use of public
funds. The attempt to apply the trade secrets exemption so broadly, as
well as the use of such terms as "need" and "relevancy" in other AEC
regulations,"' suggests an attempt by the Commission to avoid full dis-
closure.
73. 10 C.F.R. § 9.5(a)(4)(i)-(ii) (1972).
74. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ; Consumers Union of United
States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
75. Benson v. General Serv. Administration, 289 F. Supp. 590, 594 (W.D. Wash.
1968); see Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration,
301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
76. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.744(b) (1972):
An application by a party to a proceeding for the production of Commission in-
spection reports and other records and documents, the basic purpose of which is
to record matters of fact relating to license applications . . . shall set forth the
need of the party for such documents and the relevancy thereof to the issues
in the proceeding. . . . Upon a determination of need and relevancy . . . such
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NEPA requires the issuance of an environmental impact statement
to be preceded by a process in which "the responsible Federal official shall
consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has
jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental
impact involved."" Involvement of other agencies raises the possibility
that data not otherwise exempt may be withheld as interagency memor-
anda."' The CEQ Guidelines state that:
The agency which prepared the environmental statement is re-
sponsible for making the statement and the comments received
available to the public pursuant to the provisions of the Freedom
of Information Act . . . without regard to the exclusion of
inter-agency memoranda when such memoranda transmit com-
ments of Federal agencies . . . upon the environmental impact
of proposed actions."5
The AEC has formulated a policy along the CEQ Guidelines, making its
draft and final impact statements available to the public in advance of
hearings and disclosing the statutorily required comments of other
agencies on the final drafts. Previously, statements had not been available
until the time of the hearing."0 However, agency practices in disclosing
impact statements are not uniform."
Facts contained in intra-, inter-agency correspondence other than
impact statements and official comments thereto are also likely to shed
light on both the content of the impact statement and the procedures used
to compile it. In Soucie v. David,"2 the court said of the intra-, inter-
agency memorandum exemption:
records . . . will be produced if the facts recorded therein are not otherwise
available ...
Since FIA says disclosure must be to any person, there does not appear to be any reason
for having this separate rule. Apparently this sort of formulation of two sets of regula-
tions retaining expressions of discretion is fairly typical of the agencies. See Hoerster,
The 1966 Freedom of Information Act-Early Judicial Interpretations, 44 WASH. L. REV.
641 (1969).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970).
78. This section does not apply to matters that are-
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5) (1970).
79. CEQ Guidelines, supra note 43, at 7726.
80. Brooks, supra note 41, at 60.
81. This is to be expected because release of impact statements is conditioned on
FIA, and each agency has its own rules implementing FIA.
82. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The court of appeals determined that the dis-
trict court had erred in determining that the Office of Science and Technology was not
an agency within the meaning of the Act and remanded for a determination of whether
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. . . That exemption was intended to encourage the free ex-
change of ideas during the process of deliberation and policy-
making; accordingly, it has been held to protect internal com-
munications consisting of advice, recommendations, opinions,
and other material reflecting deliberative or policy-making pro-
cesses, but not purely factual or investigatory reports.8"
Therefore, even if such memoranda include nondisclosable observations
on policy, in camera review by the trial court to determine separability of
information should result in release of the factual portions of the docu-
ments.
CONCLUSION'
The complementary roles to be played by NEPA and FIA in litiga-
tion instituted to insure that environmental information is available and
considered in the nuclear power program is apparent. Courts are strictly
enforcing the procedural requirements of NEPA.s4 In addition, several
judicial decisions have demonstrated that FIA may be used to obtain
information essential for determining both the possible effects of atomic
energy projects and whether the AEC has considered them. Litigation
under NEPA and FIA alone, however, will not solve environmental
problems. As one author has commented, "it is the rare exception in which
a judicial remand to an administrative agency for further procedures
results in a changed decision." 5 But presentation of environmental in-
formation before the agencies, the public and the legislature represents
a significant step toward giving environmental values meaningful weight
in decision-making.
ALICE M. CRAFk
the agency's evaluation of the supersonic transport was protected in whole or part by
specific exemptions.
83. Id. at 1077.
84. Chief among these is the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. The vast
majority of NEPA cases have been filed in the District of Columbia pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1391 (e) (1) (1970). Perhaps not without coincidence, the D.C. Circuit has
never failed, in a reported decision, to grant disclosure in a case brought under FIA.
85. SAX, supra note 8, at 133. The Lyons salt mine disposal scheme mentioned in
the introduction to this note would probably have been such an exception had it been
taken to court. By way of contrast, following Calvert Cliffs' a newly issued preliminary
study of the questioned power plant "tentatively concluded that operation of the . . .
plant . . . will cause virtually no danger to fish in the bay or to humans who live
nearby." Washington Post, Feb. 2, 1972, § C, at 4, col. 1.
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